This paper shows why the Northern Ireland/Ireland border moved from a marginal to a core concern in the UK's withdrawal from the EU ('Brexit'). Drawing on longitudinal research on the impact of the EU on the Irish border, and contemporaneous research on the Phase 1 of negotiations of the UK's withdrawal from the EU, it explains this case study through three broad themes. First, the impact of EU membership on the transformation of the border and, secondly, the challenges posed by Brexit to the border in practical and symbolic terms. Finally, it analyses how these have been addressed in the call for 'specific solutions' to meet the UK's ambition of 'avoiding a hard border' after withdrawal. In so doing, it explores the ways in which the multi-layered complexities of a small, peripheral geographical region came to influence the course of the UK's most important set of international negotiations for half a century.
Introduction: The Irish border as a Brexit conundrum
The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching requirements. (HMG, 2017c: para. 48) It was all the more significant because many had come to believe it would not happen at all. Early morning on Friday 8 th December 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May stood alongside the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to announce that an agreed text had been reached between their two sides. The text had originally been expected to be published on Monday of that week, only to be taken off the table at the last moment following a phonecall from the Prime Minister to the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland. The conclusion of the first Phase of the Brexit negotiations -and thus progress into Phase 2, the much-anticipated talks on the 'future relationship' -was being blocked by a regional assembly politician from County Fermanagh, whose party held but ten seats in Westminster.
The reason for May's phonecall to Arlene Foster on Monday was not just courtesy -the confidence-and-supply arrangement between the Conservative Party and DUP meant that if its ten MPs were unhappy with the deal in Brussels, the stability of the UK government itself could be perceived to have been at risk. And Just why was the DUP willing make the whole EUUK government wait for its approval (and (perhaps more curiously) why were the EU negotiators willing to wait for May to succeed in gaining it)? The sticking point in the text of the Joint Report centred on Northern Ireland and the Irish border. Most particularly,P preliminary reports of the text suggested that the priority of 'avoiding a hard border' on the island of Ireland could might come at the price of harder barriers within the United Kingdom, i.e. between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The prospect of this -especially if seen to come at the behest of the Irish government -could be viewed as undermining the integrity of the UK itself, which would be anathema to the very logic of unionism. Under pressure of time, the experienced wordsmiths of civil servants from London, Brussels and Dublin set to work in finding an agreed text before the Friday. They sought to secure domestic UK cohesion at the same time as averting the risk of the Irish border returning to the centre of symbolic (and violent) conflict.
The acute difficulty facing the negotiators was that it was common UK and Irish EU membership that had created the very conditions through which the border hasd been transformed -from a sharp dividing line between states into a meeting point between 'friendly neighbours and partners in the European Union'. i The peace process embodied in the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement was facilitated by EU membership. In its most simple terms, European integration enabled national sovereignties and identities to be viewed as complementary rather than oppositional (Coakley, 2002; Hayward, 2009; Laffan, 2017; MacLaughlin, 2001; O'Duffy, 2007; Williams & Jesse, 2001 ). Such partnership is built into the cross-border institutions established by the 1998 Agreement that function specifically to ensure direct input from the Irish government into matters of common concern (Coakley, Laffan, & Todd, 2005) . The North/South Ministerial
Council, its Joint Secretariat and 'implementation bodies' working on an all-island of
Ireland basis, demonstrate the integral role played by cross-border cooperation in the governance of Northern Ireland. And at a wider level, the British-Irish Council facilitates closer cooperation between regions and nations across Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Crown Dependencies (Birrell & Gormley-Heenan, 2015; Clifford & Morphet, 2015; Tannam, 2011) .
The innovation of the 1998 Agreement centred on a careful compromise: to accept the validity of both Irish nationalism and British unionism, each of which have competing views about the legitimacy of the Irish border, but to weaken the violent potential of these competing ideologies by reducing the actual significance of the Irish border in day-to-day terms. If it is less significant important as an economic, social and cultural barrier, it is less powerful as a tool for political and ideological mobilisation. As a consequence, any significant shift in the status of the border has consequences not just for Northern Ireland but for the peace process more broadly. Although the Supreme Court ruling in January 2017 dismissed claims that the terms of the 1998 Agreement (in the 1998 Northern Ireland Act) constituted a block on the roll-out of Brexit (McCrudden & Halberstam, 2017) , the reality of the complexity of the situation in Northern
Ireland/Ireland border region has meant that it has nevertheless come to shape the withdrawal process regardless. The Irish border was forced to the centre of Phase 1 of the Brexit process by virtue of both its highly symbolic and its practicalreal-world significance.
This paper examines the import of the Irish border for the Brexit process itself, seeing it in part as a bell-weather for potential consensus and contention in the course of the UK's withdrawal. It considers the importance of the EU context for the changes to the manifestation of the Irish border that enabled symbolic and practical change that proved so vital for the peace process. The paper outlines the main challenges posed by Brexit to this change, before considering the options for squaring the circle of 'avoiding a hard border' along the UK's only land frontier with an EU neighbour in a process that was explicitly intended to 'take back control' of the UK's borders. It begins by considering the context in which state borders and border control are increasingly viewed as totems for national power in the face of acute global challenges.
Borders and Brexitian logic
The European Union was founded on the functionalist premise that cooperation across national borders can provide the optimal response to shared problems (Haas, 1968; Hodges, 1972) . Contemporary European societies, however, are increasingly drawn towards policy positions that advocate stronger, higher, 'thicker' state borders as a reaction to global challenges -challenges that, by their nature, neither begin nor end at any national frontier (Agnew, 2003; Popescu, 2012; Scott & van Houtum, 2009; Vaughan-Williams, 2012) . Official, public and media discourses reflect stark assumptions that the purpose of borders is to constrain 'mobility' and filter risks -and that failure to do so poses a threat to national cohesion and security (Lamour & Varga, 2017 can leak feed into a desire for restrictions on other types of movement (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016) . Such a position demonstrates how the negative association of open borders with risk has much greater political purchase than positive evidence of the benefits brought by cross-border mobility. It also explains why it was that the implications of Brexit for the land border on the island of Ireland went unacknowledged and unaddressed for so long by the UK government.
There are two main reasons as to why the UK government was so slow to bring the Irish border to the fore in the Brexit process, preferring instead to rely on rhetorical assurance of a 'frictionless and seamless border' (HMG, 2017a: 8.49; HMG, 2017b: passim) . First Secondly, the lack of understanding of the contested nature of the Irish border and its connection to the peace process remains prevalent in Great Britain. If Brexitian logic is an expression of nostalgic nationalism -in which the boundaries of state, national culture and territory converge unproblematically -it is unsurprising that the Irish border poses a major stumbling block in the process of UK withdrawal from the EU. The whole point of the 1998 Agreement was to acknowledged that, as well as being contentious within Northern Ireland, these boundaries are messy 'fuzzy' and complex interrelated across these islands. The reliance of the Common Travel Area on a set of 'administrative agreements' rather than on a formal treaty or codified law, indeed, is a good example of this at work (Maher, 2018; Ryan, 2001 ). More broadly, this is why there is, and that they are contentious within Northern Ireland -hence such a the need for good British-Irish intergovernmental relations: close British-Irish cooperation can to help defuse the significance of the state divide, emphasising emphasise and build upon commonality and mutual interest not difference (Hayward, 2009; Meehan, 2000; Williams & Jesse, 2001 ).
For Tto understand the power of borders, it is vital to understand their multifaceted and multilayered nature (Herrschel, 2011; Laine, 2016) . Borders are products of bordering processes, i.e. everyday institutional and discursive practices that construct and reproduce categories of socio-spatial and cultural difference (Scott, 2015) . In border studies, a border is conceived now less as a physical and often static geographic outcome of socio-spatial dynamics, to being understand as a dynamic functional process (Scott & van Houtum, 2009; Vukov & Sheller, 2013) . Borders can be exploited to both transform and fix territory, security, identities, emotions and memories (Paasi, 2012) .
The process of Brexit is can be understood as an attempt to fix and secure the UK's borders. It is important to recognised that this not unique to the UK; indeed, the response of many European countries to what became known as the 'migration crisis' of 2015 was to secure their borders in a very literal way (Hayward, 2018; VaughanWilliams, 2015) . In fact, under pressure from member-states, the EU itself has allowed for the temporary reintroduction of internal border checks within the Schengen Zone alongside a long-term strategy for enhancing external border controls, such as the development of a European Border and Coast Guard (Niemann & Zaun, 2018) .
This means that the UK is seeking to 'take back control' of its borders just as the EU is going to new lengths to secure its external frontiers. The Irish border is thus set to become an UK/EU boundary line at a time when the 'hardening' of borders is not anathema to either party. But this is no typical state border. Although in a way that jars with much of the transformative logic of the peace process on the island of Ireland. To frame this in border studies terms: the functional-territorial interpretation of the UK/Ireland border is paramount in real terms, the peace process in Northern Ireland has depended on a more fluid conception of this border. Within Northern Ireland, but it remains so politically contentious in Northern Ireland that the much more complex sociological-cultural dimensions of British/Irish borders British and Irish, nationalist and unionist identities have been presented as equal whilst have been allowed to flourish, recognising the reality of cross-border networks, services, kindship ties, identities and movements development across the Irish border these islandshave been facilitated and even institutionalised. The 1998 Agreement upheld the contradictions of the border -: it is as both a deep ideological divide and as a unique meeting pointpoint of integration between Ireland and the UK -are embedded in its history and . This contradiction risks being exposed by the process of the UK's withdrawal from the EU.
As discussed below, the situation of the Irish border has been repeatedly framed in the process of Brexit as being 'unique'; this is primarily because of the central importance of the border not just for the movement of goods or people but for a peace process in which two states are closely tied (McCall, 2014) .
For this reason, the Irish border has a different status in the process of Brexit from that of the two other contested 'national' borders that are under renewed scrutiny in light of
Brexit. There are parallels between Scotland and Northern Ireland, given that internal political divisions have been exacerbated by Brexit, and that both returned solid Remain votes in the 2016 referendum (65% from Scotland, 58% from Northern Ireland) (Hughes & Hayward, 2018) . However, there are major differences between the two, specifically that the status of the Scottish border is not connected to a peace process involving an external state and in the unionist/nationalist debate in Scotland is not connected to the citizenship and constitution of an external state. The frontier between Gibraltar and Spain is another contested border but it is not disputed by the vast majority of residents in Gibraltar. The Irish border, in contrast, has been a subject of contestation -and violent conflict -within Northern Ireland since it was first drawn..
The Irish border: customs barrier, security frontier
The meandering Irish land border runs for just under 500 km across the northern part of the island of Ireland, dividing the Republic of Ireland from the six counties of Northern
Ireland, a region of the United Kingdom. At 1.81m, the population of Northern Ireland constitutes 28% of the population on the island but just 3% of the United Kingdom. It with each legislature acting in almost wilful ignorance of the effects of its policies and laws on the other. The symbolic significance of the border for both unionism and nationalism alike was not translated into any sustained effort to ameliorate its negative effects, even in the border region itself (Leary, 2016) . For the largely rural and impoverished borderlands, there were particularly dire consequences from severing the close social, economic and kinship ties that ran across what had previously been merely county boundary lines.
Border enforcement policies ran the gamut from 'soft' to 'hard' to 'extreme'. Early on, the border checkpoints were only for customs and initially for a limited range of goods, including some manufactured goods. Whilst inconvenient for residents and disruptive to many local retailers, the sharp edge of the customs border did not become fully apparent until a decade later, when duties on agricultural produce began to be required, in response to the economic war between the British and Irish governments. This trade war -which escalated to include steel and coal -demonstrated the willingness of both governments to enact policies with highly damaging consequences for cross-border relations and economic fortunes (Kennedy, 2000; Walker, 2012 ).
The problems of smuggling and black marketeering around the border were worsened by the outbreak of the Second World War. Ireland's neutrality meant that the effects of the war were much more acutely felt on the northern side of the border. Northern (Diez & Hayward, 2008; Hayward, 2006; Laffan, 2017) .
Ultimately, it appears that it is not so much the actors or structures of the European Union but the actual process of European integration itself that has served to facilitate cooperation across ideological, political and territorial borders.
The process of European integration has made a critical difference in two ways. First, it has enabled a conception of national sovereignty that is able to accept substantial crossborder integration and transnational harmonisation. This is important in relation to the Irish border because it helped to detoxify the very notion of cross-border cooperation.
Being able to frame such contact and collaboration in pragmatic rather than political terms was essential to enabling both the British government and unionist politicians to accept it. From this platform the notion of an 'all-island economy' and 'mutual benefit' developed, to such a degree that unionist politicians could use these terms in relation to cross-border movement without being accused of compromising their unionist principles. This is so important because it meant that it was possible for British unionism and Irish nationalism to be seen to retain ideological integrity -which centred The 1998 Agreement not only has constitutional and institutional significance; its practical implementation relies on establishing and maintaining a regulatory context for cross-border movement and cooperation (Phinnemore & Hayward, 2017) . Even private sector cross-border cooperation has relied heavily upon funding streams from the EU, notably Interreg (through the European Regional Development Fund) and Peace programmes (since 1995, through the Structural Funds). These programmes have been worth over €2.75bn since 1994, funding over 500 cross-border economic development projects and operated by over 160 private, community and public organisations (Magennis & Hayward, 2014 ).
This direct investment complements a wider environment supporting cross-border movement, for people, services and goods. More generally, the price distortions created by a northern exit of the single European market present both a financial and security challenge to policy-makers on both sides of the border. Returning to a disintegrated market would entail increased costs and risks for both jurisdictions -in particular as it would revive the same incentive for black market trade that fuelled smuggling operations across the border prior to EEC accession. Together this would undermine the consumption tax and import revenues collected by both states. Northern Ireland's structural financial vulnerability and publicsector reliance on the British exchequer means that there is little that any devolved legislature could do to allow it to escape this painful reality. In essence, a 'hard' Brexit (including exit from the customs union) would threaten the economic sustainability of the borderland region, risks market disintegration in Ireland, and presents a heavy barrier to further socio-economic development across the border.
Yet sometimes the intangible effects of a policy or process are the most important.
Perhaps the most successful dimension of Irish cross-border integration through joint EU membership -which has only been fully manifest since the peace process -is its normalization; this is precisely the dimension most directly threatened by an exit from the EU. Within the context of European integration, cross-border cooperationeverything from Irish government funding for dual carriageways in Northern Ireland through to the common use of specialized health and education services -was broadly depoliticized and rationalized. Outside this context, such cooperation is not only more difficult in practical terms, it becomes symbolically and politically more sensitive.
Indeed, because cross-border cooperation will then require political will and action at several levels on both sides of the border, it can both be (a) less likely to happen and (b) subject to misinterpretation, or over-egging, by political opponents and political friends.
This carries particular risks in a divided society such as Northern Ireland, where political capital still rests on emphasizing adherence to a particular standpoint on the Irish border. For the last decade or so, drawing attention to the border -and making it subject to politicking in this way -is something that generally only critics of the peace process have been keen to do. The quest for flexibility and imagination placed huge pressure on both the UK and EU negotiators, centring as it does on the need to stretch the traditional interpretations of the 'integrity' of both the supranational EU and national UK territorial order.
Bespoke arrangements and possibilities
The willingness on the part of the EU to find 'flexible and imaginative' solutions for Bespoke arrangements for Northern Ireland may therefore be accepted, but the preference on both sides is for a UK-wide solution that avoids a hard border on the island of Ireland. The best outcome for ensuring 'frictionless' borders within the UK and between the UK and EU is for the UK to remain in the Single Market and in a customs union with the EU. This, however, has been ruled out by the UK government, as acknowledged in the Joint Report (HMG, 2017c) .What cannot be ruled out at any stage in the UK withdrawal process is that which would be the worst possible outcome for Northern Ireland: a 'no deal' scenario. This would mean that the UK would be obliged to impose customs controls on movement of all goods according to WTO rules (assuming an agreement on terms is reached within the WTO), and, depending on its tariff policy, ensure that duties are paid and collected for goods crossing the Irish border. The EU would also have to enforce a hard customs border. Cross-border cooperation across the Irish border in terms of trade in goods and in service sectors would be seriously compromised.
Mindful of these risks, after tortuous Phase 1 negotiations, a mapping exercise of crossborder cooperation on the island, and an anxious last-minute wait for the DUP to be brought on board (as noted at the start of this article), the UK-EU Joint Report of 8
December 2017 (HMG, 2017c) was announced. It offered three scenarios for regulating trade between the UK and EU and in particular across the Irish border. The first workable scenario is the one that the UK has set as its overarching aim: the future UK/EU trade deal is constructed in such a way as to allow for there to be no customs controls (or 'hard' border) either down the Irish Sea or along the Irish border. The problem with this is that it is not possible to have a trade deal that manages to cover the full set of commitments that the UK has entered into in the Joint Report while leaving the Customs Union and the Single Market. There would, in particular, be a need for a customs border between the UK and the EU.
If a UK/EU trade deal cannot guarantee a frictionless border, we move into Scenario 2, in which the UK will 'propose specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland'. Subsequent paragraphs in the Joint Report assume that these solutions can be found and require that they will include necessary oversight mechanisms to ensure that the integrity of the single market and customs union is preserved. Scenario 3 is one in which there are no 'agreed solutions' for Northern
Ireland. In which case, the UK has committed to 'maintaining full alignment' with:
'those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, 
Conclusion
Territorial and sovereign nation-statehood, with an emphasis on the majority will of the country, are central to the European Union (as seen in its muted reaction to the harsh Spanish response to the Catalan independence movement in Autumn 2017). The EU is, first and foremost, a collaboration between nation-states working for mutual (primarily economic) interest, and it relies upon the premise that interests of each state are best realised overall through cooperation. The power of the EU lies in the fact that its member-states choose to cooperate.
In a similar way, the 1998 Agreement is a thoroughly EU agreement; the prime importance of territorial borders for nation-statehood is in no doubt. The 1998
Agreement attempted to defuse the conflictual potential of the functional and symbolic border -efforts which were actively facilitated and normalized by the EU context.
There are new multilevel institutions and structures enabling new and deeper forms of transnational cooperation, but yet there is no change to the constitutional status unless a majority will it to be so. What prevents the 1998 Agreement from being a truly postnationalist Agreement is the requirement of a border poll for constitutional change to happen. The peace process thus rests on a precarious but essential paradox: Northern
Ireland remains an integral part of the UK but only until such a point as a border poll indicates popular desire for a united Ireland.
The case study of the Irish border and Brexit exemplifies the conjoined nature of the symbolic, discursive and identity aspects of borders with their 'hard', functional aspects. If the UK leaves the Single Market and Customs Union, there must be hard consequences along the Irish border -consequences that fly in the face of the reality (and necessity) of cross-border movement. If it is to prove possible to square the circle of 'avoiding a hard border' along the EU's new external frontier whilst upholding the 'legal order' of both the UK and the EU, it will require approaches to border management that will be entirely innovative and would represent new forms of twentyfirst century bordering processes. This is the challenge faced in Phase 2 of the Brexit negotiations on the 'future relationship' and long into the post-withdrawal negotiations setting out the 'future relationship' -and it is a challenge equally for the UK and the EU.
